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SOVEREIGNTY CONSIDERATIONS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN THE WAKE OF INDIA’S RECENT
SODOMY CASES
Deepa Das Acevedo*

American constitutional law scholars have long questioned whether courts can
really drive social reform, and this position remains largely unchallenged even in
the wake of recent landmark decisions affecting the LGBT community. In
contrast, court watchers in India—spurred by developments in a special type of
legal action developed in the late 1970s known as “public interest litigation,” or
“PIL”—have only recently begun questioning the judiciary’s ability to promote
progressive social change. Indian scholarship on this point has veered between
despair that PIL cases no longer reliably produce good outcomes for India’s most
disadvantaged, and optimism that public interest litigation can be returned to its
glory days of heroic judicial intervention. And no pair of cases so nicely captures
this dichotomy as the 2009 decision in Naz Foundation, which decriminalized
sodomy, and the 2012 decision in Suresh Kumar Koushal, which overruled
Naz. This paper uses public interest litigation and India’s recent sodomy cases to
demonstrate that the relationship between state actors (like courts) and society is
often far less stable than the democratic ideal of “citizen sovereignty” would
suggest.
I argue, first, that supporters of public interest litigation should neither
give up on PIL suits as a means of effecting social reform nor imagine that PIL
suits can ever reliably produce desirable outcomes. As a type of legal action, public
interest litigation simply cannot be reverse engineered in this way. But second, I
reinterpret the documented and widely critiqued shift in PIL cases from protecting
fundamental rights during the 1970s and ‘80s to protecting the interests of
advantaged litigants in the 1990s and 2000s. While earlier PIL cases reflect the
Indian Constitution’s commitment to government-led social reform and the sharing
of sovereignty between citizens and the state, contemporary PIL cases reflect the
Constitution’s commitment to an agency theory of sovereignty whereby government
merely acts on behalf of citizens. Because neither vision of sovereignty is paramount
over the long run, shifts in public interest litigation reflect the productive and
dynamic equilibrium between the two.
Sharswood Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School. AB, Princeton
(2006); PhD, University of Chicago (2013); JD, University of Chicago
(2016). My thanks to John Comaroff and participants in the 2012 Law and
Social Sciences Research Network Conference in Pune, India for their
suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper and, as always, to John F.
Acevedo.
*
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INTRODUCTION
The idea of legal liberalism—that courts can be the means of
progressive social change—has been on something of a roller-coaster
ride in the United States. Scholars documenting the ups and downs
of this journey usually begin with the rise of legal realism toward the
end of the nineteenth century and the subsequent development of
legal process theory, then focus on the Warren Court and the
Supreme Court’s conservative turn in the 1970s and 1980s, and
usually taper off around the rise of neo-republican theory in the
1980s and 90s. 1 Most recently, Obergefell 2 and its precursors have
prompted some commentators—usually critics3—to argue that the
Court is once again acting as an agent of social change, although this
view has been rejected by other commentators across the political

On the definition of legal liberalism, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER
2 (1996) (calling it “trust in the potential of courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, to bring about ‘those specific social reforms that
affect large groups of people such as blacks, or workers, or women, or partisans of
a particular persuasion; in other words, policy chance with nationwide impact’”).
2 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __ (2015). See also KALMAN, supra note 1, at 88
(noting that “by 1980, legal liberalism was feeble”).
3 See, e.g., David Upham, Symposium: A tremendous defeat for “We the People” and our
posterity, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 26, 2015, 4:26 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-a-tremendous-defeat-for-wethe-people-and-our-posterity/ (arguing that “it [cannot] plausibly be said that the
people at large have generally demanded today’s result. As the Court noted, the
states and the people remain deeply divided”).
1

OF LEGAL LIBERALISM

1
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spectrum.4 For the most part, American legal liberalism has been
having a rough time of it for around three decades.
Of course, whether or not courts can—and should—be
agents of social reform is hardly a uniquely American debate. Similar
conversations occur among scholars of Israeli law in regards to the
successfulness and desirability of “values-based” judging.5 They are
also common among Canadian Charter scholars on either side of the
“court-party thesis,” according to which citizen interest groups drive
judicial interpretation of the Charter and “judges drive the Charter, not
vice versa.”6
See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, 2 THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2008). See also Stephen M. Feldman, (Same) Sex,
Lies, and Democracy: Tradition, Religion, and Substantive Due Process (with an
Emphasis on Obergefell v. Hodges), 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 341, 351
(2015) (“Supreme Court decisions, including Obergefell, do not wield sufficient
power to change society independently of other societal and cultural forces.”); Kyle
C. Velte, Obergefell’s Expressive Promise, 6 Houston L. Rev. Off Rec. 157, 161
(2015–16) (“Because Obergefell’s holding—“[t]he nugget that will have binding
precedential effect”—is narrow, it will not regulate behavior outside of marriage. It
will not prohibit discrimination against LGBT individuals in other contexts. Thus,
the promise that Obergefell holds to effect broad, positive change—to propel the law
toward formal equality—is in its expressive power.”); Ilya Shapiro, Introduction,
2014–15 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9 (2014–15) (arguing that “The result [in Obergefell]
was wholly expected given the rapid shifts in popular opinion on the subject, as
well as the Court’s ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act two years ago in United
States v. Windsor”).
5 On “values-based judging,” see, e.g., MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE
CULTURE OF ISRAEL 38 (2011) (critically describing the “courts as agents of liberal
values”); Aharon Barak, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy, 33 ISR. L. REV 1,
3 (1999) (“In the creation of judicial law—a product of judicial discretion—the
judge gives expression to the basic values of the legal system… The values which
direct the judge… are not the results of public-opinion surveys, nor of populism
which sweeps the masses… Indeed, when society is not faithful to itself, the judge
is not obliged to give expression to the fleeting winds of the hour”). On the role of
courts in effecting social change, compare Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role
of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 46–47 (Fac. Scholarship Series, Paper No. 3692,
2002) (arguing, in contrast to ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (2008) that “I do
not claim that the court can cure every ill of society, nor do I claim that it can be the
primary agent for social change”) (emphasis mine) with Ruth Gavison, The Role of
Courts in Rifted Democracies, 33 ISR. L. REV. 216, 233 (1999) (arguing, in agreement
with ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, that “courts have neither purses nor
swords … they must rely on the cooperation and the good will of the other powers
to positively implement their decisions. When such cooperation is not forthcoming,
the court's decision remains ineffective”).
6 See, e.g., Lise Gotell, Book Review, 9 QUEEN’S L. J. 843, 896 (2005) (reviewing
CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, FEMINIST ACTIVISM IN THE SUPREME COURT:
LEGAL MOBILIZATION AND THE WOMEN’S LEGAL EDUCATION AND ACTION
FUND (2004) and noting that Manfredi acknowledges that “there is no necessary
4
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Like the United States, India is experiencing something of a
downward adjustment in the way scholars, lawyers, and judges think
of court-driven progressive change, but the context and implications
of this shift are hugely and necessarily distinct. Let’s begin with some
constitutional prose. Comparative analyses of the Indian and
American constitutions have usually characterized the former as
“militant” and the latter as “acquiescent” in terms of the relationship
they envision between the state and society.7 In this narrative, India’s
founding document sets up a state that seeks to reform society by
challenging old practices and affirming new rights. Conversely, the
American Constitution seeks merely to preserve the status quo and
establish negative rights in the mode of classical liberalism. 8
Unsurprisingly, then, signs that legal liberalism may be on the wane
carry a different and arguably a more dispiriting significance in India.
To be sure, there are great problems with this way of talking
about constitutions in general and about the Indian Constitution in
particular.9 An important goal of this paper is to add one more data
point in support of the argument that Indian constitutional
jurisprudence actually and appropriately reflects a “dynamic
equilibrium” between two very different visions of state-society
relations, rather than being straightforwardly committed to state-led
reform.10 Each of these visions of state-society relations corresponds
to an understanding of how sovereignty works in a democracy. Some
elements of the Indian Constitution reflect a fairly conventional
connection between favourable legal change, positive policy consequences, social
conditions and movement building” and that “[d]rawing on Rosenberg's work,
Manfredi complicates his doctrinal analysis of feminist influence by analyzing
litigation and legal decisions as part of a broader process of social and political
mobilization”); F.L. Morton, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party, 30 OSGOODE
HALL L. J. 627, 630 (1992).
7 GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 216 (2010).
8 But see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution was not primarily
influenced by negative rights in the classical liberal mode and that the status quo
the revolutionaries were seeking to preserve was an older, non-property-based
conception of Englishmen’s rights).
9 See, e.g., PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS 203 (1993)
(“The state was connected to the people-nation not simply through the procedural
forms of representative government; it also acquired its representativeness by
directing a program of economic development on behalf of the nation…The two
connections did not necessarily have the same implications for a state trying to
determine how to use its sovereign powers”).
10 Deepa Das Acevedo, Temples, Courts, and Dynamic Equilibrium in the Indian
Constitution, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. __ (2016).

3

40 Boston College Int’l & Comp. Law Review __ (2017)
Please Do Not Cite Without Permission

“agency” view of governmental authority, 11 while others envision
such an active or “militant” role for government that it is difficult to
view the state as merely the agent of the sovereign people.12 Since
neither of these visions of sovereignty is—or is meant to be—
paramount over the long run, they exist in a perpetual and dynamic
equilibrium with one another. Part III will briefly describe these two
visions and explain how they are borne up by the specific aspect of
Indian law, public interest litigation, that’s at issue here.
A second reason why a decline in legal liberalism has different
implications for India is that the history of court-driven change (rather
than merely state or law-driven change) as well as the public reception
of such change have been markedly different there.13 While Indian
courts have always had an important role in advancing and upholding
progressive policies, they have been especially prominent since the
rise of public interest litigation in the 1970s. Unlike in the United
States, where “public interest law” refers to any legal work or
advocacy done for the greater good or for those who cannot afford
representation,14 Indian “public interest litigation” (PIL) is a distinct
way of articulating a legal complaint, much like filing an individual
civil suit is different from filing a class action or an administrative
grievance.15 Framing a complaint as a PIL suit allows petitioners to
Das Acevedo, supra note 10, at __ (describing how many contract theories of
democracy view sovereignty “like an object whose ownership can’t really be
shared” but which needs to be delegated from “the people” to their representatives
for the purposes of effective governance).
12 Das Acevedo, supra note 10, at __ (arguing that the Indian Constitution
“envisions a state with huge independent discretion to control social ordering” and
that “[h]aving that kind of discretion baked right into one’s constitutional cake
means that sovereignty can’t wholly owned by citizens: it has to be shared by both
citizens and the state”).
13 See, e.g., K.G. Balakrishnan, Chief Justice of India, Fifteenth Annual Lecture at
the Singapore Academy of Law (Oct. 8, 2008) (on file with author):
The main rationale for ‘judicial activism’ in India lies in the highly unequal
social profile of our population, where judges must take proactive steps to
protect the interests of those who do not have a voice in the political system
and do not have the means or information to move the Courts. This places the
Indian Courts in a very different social role as compared to several developed
nations where directions given by ‘unelected judges’ are often viewed as
unjustified restraints on the will of the majority.
14 See, e.g., What is Public Interest Law?, HLS.HARVARD.EDU,
http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-is-public-interest-law/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2016) (defining public interest law by practice setting, work type, and issue area,
among other things).
15 On public interest litigation see generally, Ashok H. Desai & S. Muralidhar, Public
Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE 159 (B.N.
11
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avoid traditional standing requirements (like personal harm) and
briefing requirements (like the submission of formal writ petitions) in
the interests of removing barriers to justice for the most
disadvantaged.16 Additionally, courts hearing PIL suits often act as
quasi-arbitrators, conduct independent fact-finding, and require
periodic progress reports from the parties.17 And not infrequently,
courts themselves instigate PIL “suits” by taking suo motu cognizance of
specific issues.18
Given these striking features and the stack of extremely
progressive PIL cases that were decided early on—as well as a
growing sense that India’s executive and legislative branches are
incapable of governing—it’s no wonder that public interest litigation
is increasingly viewed as a crucial tool for a Court focused on “good
governance.”19 Simultaneously, however, PIL cases have become a
popular tool for petitioners pursuing urban, middle-class, or socially
conservative ends—so much so, in fact, that contemporary
Kirpal et. al. eds., 2000); Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in
India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495 (1989); Rajeev Dhavan,
Whose Law, Whose Interest, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW (Jeremy Cooper & Rajeev
Dhavan eds., 1986); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
16 On standing, see Upendra Baxi v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, 2 S.C.C.
308 (1983) (an early classic in public interest litigation that featured a famous law
professor petitioning on behalf of the residents of a women’s home). On briefing,
see Khatri v. State of Bihar, 1981 A.I.R. (S.C.) 928, 1 S.C.C. 623 (another
benchmark case, in which a lawyer forwarded a newspaper article detailing prison
abuses to the Supreme Court and the Court treated the article as a writ petition).
Khatri and its companion cases at 1 S.C.C. 627 and 1 S.C.C. 635 are collectively
known as the “Bhagalpur Blinding Cases” and gave rise to what is commonly
known in India as “epistolary jurisdiction.” Susan D. Susman, Distant Voices in the
Court of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest Litigation, 13 WIS. INT’L L. J.
54, 58 n. 3 (1994-95).
17 See, e.g., Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1988
S.C. 2187 in which the Court appointed expert committees to determine whether
mining in the Doon Valley had adverse environmental impact and also created a
monitoring committee which continued to oversee “quarrying and mining
operations in the Valley even more than a decade after the final disposal of the case
in 1988”). Videh Upadhyay, Changing Judicial Power: Courts on Infrastructure Projects and
Environment, 35 ECON. & POL. WKLY 3789, 3790 (2000).
18 Marc Galanter & Vasujith Ram, Suo Moto Intervention and the Indian Judiciary
(Sept. 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
19 Nick Robinson, Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court,
8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (discussing the “Court’s
development of two new tools—the basic structure doctrine and its expanded right
to life jurisprudence—to address…apparent failings of representative
governance”).
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scholarship on public interest litigation is overwhelmingly
preoccupied with asking if this much beloved hallmark of Indian
jurisprudence can be saved or even defended.20
Few cases better reflect the shifting tone of public interest
litigation and of legal liberalism in India than the 2009 opinion in Naz
Foundation 21 that decriminalized sodomy and the 2013 Koushal 22
decision that reversed Naz. Both were PIL suits; the first was filed in
the Delhi High Court by an NGO focusing on HIV/AIDS and
sexual health issues, while the second was filed in the Supreme Court
by lead petitioners described as “citizens of India who believe they
have the moral responsibility and duty in protecting cultural values of
Indian society.”23 Read together, Naz and Koushal express the primary
argument of this paper—at once narrow and extremely contentious
(at least among scholars of Indian law)—that public interest litigation
can never reliably advance certain kinds of progressive outcomes.
To be perfectly clear, I am not just saying that PIL cases have
increasingly produced outcomes favoring advantaged litigants. This
descriptive argument has already been made, with excellent empirical
support and in many different areas of the law, by several lawyers and
legal academics.24 Nor am I advocating any particular way of “fixing”
Raju Ramachandran, The Supreme Court and the Basic Structure Doctrine, in SUPREME
BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
107 (B.N. Kirpal et al eds., 2008); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Pro-Human Rights but
Anti-Poor? A Critical Evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court from a Social Movement
Perspective, 18 HUM. RTS REV. 157, 158 (2007) (arguing that “the Court’s activism
increasingly manifests several biases – in favor of the state and development, in
favor of the rich and against workers, in favor of the urban middle-class and against
rural farmers”); SHOBHA AGGARWAL, THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION HOAX:
TRUTH BEFORE THE NATION: A CITIZEN’S REPORT ON HOW PIL FAILS TO
PROVIDE JUSTICE TO THOSE WHO NEED IT MOST (2005) (arguing that public
interest litigation has faltered because of the Supreme Court’s shift away from
principles of “natural justice”); Prashant Bhushan, Supreme Court and PIL: Changing
Perspectives Under Liberalisation, 39 ECON. & POL. WKLY 18 (2004)
21 Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, Writ Petition (Civil) No.7455
of 2001 (henceforth Naz).
22 Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013
(henceforth Koushal).
23 Id. at 15.
24 Varun Gauri & Poorvi Chitalkar, The Distributional Impact of Public Interest
Litigation in the Indian Supreme Court—an Update (unpublished conference
paper) (Sept. 25, 2015) (on file with author); Varun Gauri, Public Interest Litigation
in India: Overreaching or Underachieving?, World Bank Pol’y Rsrch Working
Paper 5109 (Nov. 2009) (on file with author); SHYLASHRI SHANKAR, SCALING
JUSTICE: INDIA’S SUPREME COURT, ANTI-TERROR LAWS, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
(2009); Rakesh Shukla, Rights of the Poor: An Overview of Supreme Court, 41 ECON. &
POL. WEEKLY 3755 (2006).
20
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public interest litigation such that it returns to its early focus on
removing barriers to justice, expanding or enforcing constitutional
rights, and resolving group-based disadvantages. Packing the Indian
Supreme Court with 1980s-style activist justices or urging sitting
justices to abandon their “command-and-control” model of case
management for a more “facilitative” one are, I think, equally
unrealistic options and unlikely to restore public interest litigation’s
focus on the country’s most marginalized citizens.25 Indeed, if the only
thing that will resuscitate the worth of public interest litigation is the
kind of rights-enforcing opinions common during the first 10–15
years of PIL history (perhaps augmented by the lessons in alternative
dispute resolution learned since then), I am quite doubtful there is
anything we can concertedly do.
But this—despite the heartbreaking outcome in Koushal—may
not be as bad as it sounds. For one thing, a few recent opinions
suggest that public interest litigation isn’t, in a purely consequentialist
sense, already a lost cause.26 More importantly, the kind of courtdriven progressive social reform captured in the early PIL cases, vital
and thrilling as it is, is only half the story of democratic governance in
India. Even state-driven reform, however rights-enhancing it may be,
does not so define Indian democracy that the periodic (or even
somewhat frequent) failure of PIL cases to achieve progressive
outcomes spells decay and doom. Rather, it is the dynamic interplay
between a fairly conventional, citizen-sovereignty vision of
democratic government and a more unusual support for state- (and
court-) led reform that gives Indian democracy the flexibility it needs
to survive over the long run.
Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Swallowing a Bitter PIL? Reflections on Progressive Strategies
for Public Interest Litigation in India, in TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
COMPARING THE APEX COURTS OF BRAZIL, INDIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA 519, 522
(Oscar Vilhena et al. eds., 2013); Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Revisiting The Role of the
Judiciary in Plural Societies (1987): A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Public Interest
Litigation in India and the Global South, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
SOUTH ASIA 341, 362-65 (Sunil Khilnani et al. eds., 2013).
26 See, e.g., National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil)
No. 604 of 2013 (Apr. 15, 2014), available at
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=41411 (establishing legal
recognition for a “third gender” and directing national and state governments to
create reservations for third gender individuals in educational institutions and
public employment); and Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India &
Others, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001 (Nov. 28, 2001), available at
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/nov28.html (requiring state governments
to provide every child attending a government or government-aided primary school
with a free, cooked midday meal).
25
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Because public interest litigation is this paper’s window into
the relationship between courts, social change, and sovereignty, Part I
overviews the belief in the ameliorative potential of PIL suits as well
as recent disillusionment on that front. Part II zeroes in on Naz and
Koushal, spending some time on the reasoning in each case as well as
paying special attention to the kind of “public morality” envisioned in
each decision. Part III briefly summarizes the idea of dynamic
equilibrium as a theory of constitutional identity and design before
exploring how the overall changes in PIL outcomes (discussed in Part
I) and the specific outcomes in Naz and Koushal (discussed in Part II)
exemplify that structure. For the legal liberals among us, describing
Indian constitutional jurisprudence and public interest litigation this
way should be both reassuring and worrisome: PIL cases may not be
failing progressives as much as is commonly feared, but they were
never meant to be sure-fire tools of reform either.
I. PUBLIC CONFUSION OVER PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
Indian lawyers and law scholars generally describe the initial
period of Supreme Court PIL suits—roughly, the late 1970s through
early 1990s—in the language of heroic judicial intervention. 27 A
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court called it “a potent
weapon” and an example of how “[j]udicial creativity… has enabled
realisation of the promise of socio-economic justice made in the
Preamble to the Constitution of India.”28 A Supreme Court attorney
described public interest litigation as the product of “two justices…
[who] recognised the possibility of providing access to justice to the
The Indian Supreme Court is a court of original jurisdiction for plaintiffs who
assert fundamental rights violations. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Part III:
Fundamental Rights, art. 32(1). It’s also generally believed that public interest
litigation as a means of vindicating fundamental rights conforms to Article 39(A),
located in the non-justiceable “Directive Principles” section of the Constitution.
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Part IV: Directive Principles of State Policy, art. 39(A).
(“The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on
a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by
suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for
securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other
disabilities.”). Although PIL suits can also be heard by High Courts and many
important PIL cases have been decided by High Courts, scholarly debates over
public interest litigation have overwhelmingly focused on the Supreme Court.
28 Justice Dr A.S. Anand, Judicial Review – Judicial Activism – Need for Caution, in LAW
& JUSTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY 383 (Soli J. Sorabjee ed., 2004).
27
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poor and the exploited people by relaxing the rules of standing.”29
And this sentiment is not unwarranted: early PIL cases forced
negligent town councils to provide slum dwellers with basic
sanitation facilities, released individuals whose pre-trial detentions
exceeded the maximum penalty for their alleged crimes, and
compensated women raped by on-duty Indian soldiers. 30 In other
words, public interest litigation has unarguably been thought of as a
vehicle for advancing equality and affirmative rights, and in many
instances it’s—also unarguably—been successful in this mission.
Besides raw outcomes, the good vibes surrounding public
interest litigation also emanate from a sense that the Supreme Court
only devised the approach (and PIL petitioners only continue to use
it) out of sheer necessity. Governmental malfunction is a
longstanding theme in Indian politics, especially at the federal level.
Indeed, “malfunction” is a kind of extreme euphemism for much of
what happens in New Delhi: 34% of sitting Lok Sabha members face
criminal charges,31 the last ten years alone have seen a number of
scandals with price tags between USD $30–40 billion a piece,32 and
the current Prime Minister was under criminal investigation as late as
2012 in connection with the mass killing of Muslims in his state
during his chief ministership. 33 In 2015, India ranked #76 on

Jasper Vikas George, Public Interest Litigation: Social Change and Public Interest
Litigation in India, NGOSINDIA.COM (Aug. 3, 2005),
http://www.ngosindia.com/resources/pil_sc.php.
30 Ratlam Municipality v. Vardhichand, AIR 1980 SC 1622; Hussainara Khatoon v.
State of Bihar (I to VI) 1 SCC 81 (1980); Delhi Domestic Working Women’s
Forum v. Union of India, 1 SCC 14 (1995).
31 The Lok Sabha is the lower house of Parliament. Rukmini S., 16th Lok Sabha will
be richest, have most MPs with criminal charges, THE HINDU (May 19, 2014),
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/16th-lok-sabha-will-be-richest-havemost-mps-with-criminal-charges/article6022513.ece (noting that this represents an
increase from 30% in 2009 and 24% in 2004).
32 Beina Xu, Governance in India: Corruption, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/corruption-and-bribery/governance-indiacorruption/p31823 (describing, among others, the 2010-11 “Telecom” scandal with
an estimated governmental cost of $39 billion, and the 2012 “Coalgate” scandal
with an estimated cost of $34 billion)
33 For an overview of the court cases and investigations that was written before
Narendra Modi became Prime Minister see Anonymous, India: A Decade on, Gujarat
Justice Incomplete, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 24, 2012),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/24/india-decade-gujarat-justice-incomplete.
For an account of investigation efforts that have taken place since Modi took
office, and of the harassment endured by the investigators, see David Barstow,
Longtime Critic of Modi is Now a Target, NYTIMES.COM (Aug. 19, 2015),
29
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Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (between
Burkina Faso and Thailand), which is actually an improvement over
its 2013 performance (#94).34 Matters had reached such a peak by
early 2011 that an activist named Anna Hazare gained significant
political traction for the idea of a “people’s ombudsman” with
independent prosecutorial authority and police powers over virtually
the entire federal government (the bill, fittingly, got stuck in
Parliament). 35 There’s even a small but identifiable genre of anticorruption cinema that is equal parts fantasy and self-flagellation.36
All of this has rather understandably fed into strong support
for public interest litigation. While the federal judiciary’s halo has
lately gotten a bit tarnished, the courts still enjoy a reputation for
intent and efficacy that vastly outstrips anything the executive or
legislative branches could hope for. 37 This reputational advantage,
combined with the very real failures of the other branches and the
very real success of early PIL cases, has led supporters of public
interest litigation to argue that the courts merely step in to put right
the wrongs committed by other branches. 38 Some commentators
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/world/asia/teesta-setalvad-modiindia.html.
34 Transparency International, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2015,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#downloads (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); Xu,
supra note 32 (citing Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions
Index).
35 See, e.g., Sumanta Banerjee, Anna Hazare, Civil Society, and the State, 46 ECON. &
POL. WEEKLY 12 (2011).
36 For a tiny slice of this genre See, e.g., INDIAN (Sri Surya Movies 1996) and
MUTHALVAN (S Pictures 1999) (both Tamil) as well as RANG DE BASANTI
(Rakeysh Omprakash Mehra Pictures 2006), NO ONE KILLED JESSICA (UTV
Spotboy 2011), and SATYAGRAHA (Prakash Jha Productions 2013) (all Hindi, with
SATYAGRAHA being explicitly inspired by Anna Hazare).
37 The federal judiciary did not always enjoy such high esteem—indeed, the
development of public interest litigation was closely tied to the courts’ fall from
grace during Indira Gandhi’s Emergency of 1975–77. Upendra Baxi, The Avatars of
Indian Judicial Activism: Explorations in the Geographies of [In]Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: ITS GRASP AND REACH 157 (S.K. Verma &
Kusum eds., 2000). And the judiciary’s reputation has suffered a bit recently thanks
to allegations of corrupt personal finances, case-fixing, and irregular promotion
practices. See Manoj Mitta, A few just men who raised the bar, TIMES OF INDIA (May 16,
2010), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-toi/special-report/Afew-just-men-who-raised-the-bar/articleshow/5936089.cms; Shoma Chaudhry,
Half of the Last 16 Chief Justices Were Corrupt, TEHELKA.COM (Sept. 5, 2009),
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main42.asp?filename=Ne050909half_of.asp.
38 Gobind Das, The Supreme Court: An Overview, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 17 (B.N. Kirpal et al eds.,
2008) (“Faced with a liberal and enlightened executive it sought to cooperate with
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even maintain that given certain procedural aspects of public interest
litigation (non-adversarial engagement, ongoing investigation,
periodic reporting), courts are actually compensating for the lack of a
“genuine deliberative forum” in the legislature.39 At the very least,
many supporters of public interest litigation suggest that the other
branches’ failure to realize the substantive ends of democracy makes
them no more representative as institutions than the unelected but
populist judiciary. 40 In other words, the classic and still dominant
view is that public interest litigation is good on both principled and
consequentialist grounds.
Recently, however, the veneer has started to peel. Several
commentators argue that public interest litigation simply doesn’t
protect disadvantaged citizens the way it used to.41 For one thing,
there have been a series of landmark cases whose outcomes favored
corporate or urban middle-class interests over those of more
vulnerable populations: the “dam” cases, in which thousands of tribal
and poor rural communities were displaced to further development
projects; the “relocation” cases, in which polluting industries (and the
migrant workers who depended on them) were moved outside city
limits; and the “gentrification” cases, in which thousands (sometimes
hundreds of thousands) of low-income residents and slum dwellers
were evicted from their homes pursuant to urban beautification
projects.42 The language of these newer decisions has been harsher,
it, confronted with an aggressive and bellicose one the courts stepped aside, and
when the executive was weak or negligent the courts were obliged to step in to
ensure that the needs of the people were met.”).
39 Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Evaluating contemporary criticisms of ‘Public Interest
Litigation’: A progressive conception of the role of a Judge 31-33 (2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS
TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES 149 (2008).
40 Madhav Godbole, Good Governance: A Distant Dream, 39 ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL WEEKLY 1103 (2004); Soli Sorabjee, The Ideal Remedy: A Valediction, in
THE SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION: A CHALLENGE TO
FEDERALISM 209 (Pran Chopra ed. 2006) (“You may say that this is not the
function of the court. But look at [it] in the larger context. Look at the relief that it
has provided to this neglected segment of humanity… I would say that with all its
deficiencies, the Supreme Court has been the protector of the Fundamental Rights
of the people.”).
41 For criticisms of the “conservative” turn in public interest litigation, see generally,
Surya Deva, Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review, 28 CIV. JUST. Q. 19
(2009); Shubhankar Dam, Vineet Narain v. Union of India: A Court of Law and Not
Justice: Is the Indian Supreme Court Bound by the Indian Constitution?, 2005 PUB. L. 239
(2005).
42 For a discussion of these case types, see generally, Thiruvengadam, Swallowing a
Bitter PIL?, supra note 25; Gautam Bhan, “This is no longer the city I once knew”:
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too. In the gentrification cases, for instance, individuals who used to
be “pavement dwellers” became “encroacher[s]” and their presence
on public lands went from symbolizing their necessity and the state’s
failure to their thievery and opportunism relative to upstanding, payyour-own-way homeowners.43
Lest they be accused of cherry-picking, critics of current PIL
jurisprudence also point to preliminary quantitative studies that
suggest these landmark disappointments are representative rather
than anomalous outcomes.44 When it comes to PIL cases dealing with
Fundamental Rights claims, it seems that “claimants from advantaged
classes have higher win rates than claimants not from advantaged
classes”—and, moreover, that the disparity between win rates has
been increasing over time. 45 To be sure, there are problems with
relying on quantitative studies to show change over time in PIL
jurisprudence: early PIL cases are harder to access and classify, while
self-selection out of the court system may mean that decreasing win
rates reflect declining merit rather than changing judicial
sympathies.46 But the quantitative analyses of public interest litigation
are rapidly closing in on these issues and the prognosis still does not
Evictions, the urban poor, and the right to the city in millennial Delhi, 21 ENVT’ &
URBANIZATION 127, 134 (2009) (noting that the 2004 Pushta eviction in Delhi
displaced nearly 150,000 people).
43 Bhan, supra note 42, at 134-35 (comparing language from early PIL displacement
cases with language in comparable cases from 2000 onwards).
44 Gauri, Public Interest Litigation in India, supra note 24; SHANKAR, SCALING
JUSTICE, supra note 24; Shukla, Rights of the Poor, supra note 24.
45 Gauri, supra note 24, at 13:
…advantaged class claimants had a 73% probability of winning a
Fundamental Rights claim for cases in which an order or decision was
rendered from years 2000-2008, whereas the win rate for claimants not
from advantaged classes for the same years was 47%. For the 1990s, rates
were 68% and 47%, respectively. But in the years prior to 1990, claimants
not from advantaged classes enjoyed higher success rates than those from
advantaged classes. The differences for the 1990s and 2000s are
significantly different from each other, based on a simple chi-square test
and a simple probit estimation
46 Jayanth K. Krishnan, Social Policy Advocacy and the Role of the Courts in India, 21 AM.
ASIAN REV. 91 (2003) (arguing that social policy advocates who work on behalf of
marginalized communities are less and less likely to use the courts because the
judiciary is so backlogged). It’s unclear whether the change in PIL cases is due to
transformation in the type of case brought or type of case won, or both—or a
change in the reporting and categorizing practices of the Court. See, e.g., Gauri,
Public Interest Litigation in India, supra note 24, at 8 (“there appears to have been a
change in the nature of issues being brought to the Court through PILs”) and at 5
(stating that the “apparent increase in the share of advantaged litigants” may be “an
artifact of a change in reporting practices on the part of the Court”).
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look good.
All of this is to say that whether one considers case studies or
sky view analysis even supporters of public interest litigation tend to
feel that “the Supreme Court in the 1990s and in the current
decade[s] is refusing to enforce rights which the Court of the 1980s
would have.”47 The successful PIL petitioner today is increasingly
likely to be a middle-class individual speaking up on her own behalf
about the state’s failures in areas like corruption, pollution, and
gender equality. 48 These are all worthwhile issues and they are in
keeping with the Court’s broader shift towards a “good governance”
role. 49 Still, they are a far cry from the concerns of migrant and
bonded laborers, child workers, incarcerated under-trials, slum
dwellers, and wards of state who were the targets of early era PIL
cases, and whose problems by and large still need addressing.50 It is
increasingly not the case that public interest litigation is a “last resort
for the oppressed and the bewildered.”51
Unsurprisingly, then, current conversations about public
interest litigation are preoccupied with how to regroup and reverse
course. One suggestion has been that judges should step back from
the “command and control” model of judicial proceedings that has
come to characterize PIL cases over the last two decades and adopt a
more “facilitative” role—or, in American legal lingo, that judges
should function as mediators when they hear PIL suits.52 Another
idea is that the Supreme Court should “evolve a set of guidelines for
restrained and responsible PIL” so that the process regains legitimacy
and the outcomes are more mindful of third-party effects on
marginalized communities.53

Thiruvengadam, supra note 25, at 522.
S. Muralidhar, Public Interest Litigation, 33-34 ANN. SURVEY INDIAN L. 525, 563
(1997-98) (“The cases that were taken up for detailed consideration by the courts
[and decided in 1997-98] reflected a perceptible shift to issues concerning
governance.”).
49 Robinson, supra note 19, at 2 (arguing that the Court has justified its development
of Basic Structure Doctrine and a broad right to life jurisprudence “with not only a
wide reading of the Indian Constitution, but also an appeal to broad, almost
metaphysical, principles of “civilization” or good governance.”
50 See Usha Ramanathan, Of Judicial Power, FRONTLINE.IN (Mar. 16–29, 2002),
http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1906/19060300.htm.
51 State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, 3 S.C.C. 634, 670 (1979), cited in Lavanya
Rajamani, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India: Exploring Issues of Access,
Participation, Equity, Effectiveness, and Sustainability, 19 J. ENVTL L. 293 (2007).
52 Thiruvengadam, supra note 25.
53 Rajamani, supra note 51, at 321.
47
48
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The very idea of “fixing” public interest litigation suggests
that it can be refashioned in such a way as to once more reliably
produce the kind of progressive results achieved during its
introductory phase. Of course, few if any current commentators
would argue that public interest litigation, even if properly reformed,
would inevitably produce progressive results and some are actively
opposed to the idea.54 (I say current commentators because this was
and perhaps continues to be a popular view among an older
generation of lawyers and legal scholars.55) But even trying to fix
public interest litigation to produce mostly progressive reforms is like
trying to read only half the Indian Constitution, and it deserves a
similar response: that’s just not how it works.
This is not to say that I’m advocating the other extreme—
abandoning public interest litigation as a hopelessly lost cause—
which some commentators have proposed and which particularly
upsetting outcomes like the one in Koushal might tempt us to do.56
That’s as dispiriting and unnecessary as some of the proposals to fix
public interest litigation are logistically and politically unrealistic. But
before we get to what the shift in PIL jurisprudence really tells us
about Indian law and governance going forward, it’s worth
considering the stakes a little more deeply. What do the arguments
for or against public interest litigation tell us about law and
democracy in India? How can such a miniscule body of case law (PIL
suits account for less than 0.5% of the Supreme Court’s docket57) not
Thiruvengadam, supra note 25, at 525 (criticizing Upendra Baxi for seemingly
suggesting that “the text of the Indian Constitution inexorably points to
progressive ends, ignoring the reality that there can be several conflicting
interpretations of what exactly the constitutional values are and, more importantly,
how they are to be achieved”).
55 Sorabjee, supra note 40, at 209 (admonishing readers to “criticize [public interest
litigation] when it goes wrong” but “not question the premise on which it works”);
Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of
India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107, 126 (1985) (arguing that public interest
litigation “symbolizes the politics of liberation”).
56 See, e.g., Nivedita Menon, Environment and the Will to Rule: The Supreme Court and
Public Interest Litigation in the 1990s, in THE SHIFTING SCALES OF JUSTICE: THE
SUPREME COURT IN NEO-LIBERAL INDIA (Mayur Suresh & Siddharth Narrain,
eds., 2014); Aditya Nigam, Embedded Judiciary: Or the Judicial State of Exception?, in
THE SHIFTING SCALES OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT IN NEO-LIBERAL INDIA
(Mayur Suresh & Siddharth Narrain, eds., 2014).
57 Gauri, supra note 24, at 10 (arguing that “on average, some 0.4% of ‘cases’ before
the Court involve PILs”); Nick Robinson, Too Many Cases, 26 FRONTLINE 1 (Jan. 316, 2009),
54

http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2601/stories/200901162
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only speak to profoundly important aspects of social life but to the
very foundation of democratic governance? For these questions and
more, we need to take a brief detour into the recent Delhi High
Court and Supreme Court decisions on sodomy.
II. NAZ AND KOUSHAL
Naz and Koushal are big cases, widely discussed. Commentary
and scholarship on the two decisions is understandably vast in India
but the cases’ influence has by no means been geographically limited.
In the U.S., for instance, the New York Times greeted Naz with an oped triumphantly announcing that an “Indian Court Overturns Gay
Sex Ban.”58 Similarly, in the 26 months since Koushal was handed
down, 13 articles and notes discussing it have been published in
American law journals (to say nothing of Indian or international law
journals). 59 And across continents and publication venues, the
reviews uniformly celebrate Naz and excoriate Koushal. This section is
not directed towards challenging that assessment: if there is nothing
to like in Koushal’s substantive outcome there is considerably less to
applaud in what passes for judicial reasoning in the opinion.
Moreover, the reasoning in either case is not especially relevant to the
larger arguments of this paper concerning shifts in public interest
litigation and dynamic equilibrium in the Indian Constitution. But
because it is impossible to discuss a case without actually discussing
the case, this section will first briefly overview the facts and
arguments in Naz and Koushal before placing the decisions in the
broader context of PIL jurisprudence.

60108100.htm (arguing that “contrary to popular belief… [PILs] have one of
the court’s lowest acceptance rates” and observing that in 2006 “the [C]ourt
received almost 20,000 letter or postcard petitions… that could be considered as
PIL” but that “only 243 of these 20,000 pleas were even placed before the judges
to be considered for admission (out of which only a small fraction then made it to
regular hearing)”).
58 Heather Timmons & Hari Kumar, Indian Court Overturns Gay Sex Ban,
NYTIMES.COM (July 2, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/world/asia/03india.html?_r=0.
59 These results are based on search of the legal database LexisAdvance using the
following string: “Naz Foundation” narrowed by Secondary Materials search within
“Koushal” (Feb. 21, 2016).
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A. Public Morality, Constitutional Morality, and Feigned Deference
The named petitioner in Naz Foundation v. Gov’t of NCT of
Delhi was an NGO that concentrates on HIV/AIDS awareness and
support in India.60 The Foundation filed a PIL petition to have § 377
of the Indian Penal Code read down because the Foundation’s work
with men who have sex with men (MSM) suggested that the
criminalization of sodomy makes MSM reluctant to cooperate with
HIV/AIDs efforts.61 Other petitioners joined the effort, including
the national Ministry of Health and Welfare and an umbrella group
called “Voices Against § 377 IPC.”62 The respondents included the
Ministry of Home Affairs as well as an activist organization called the
Joint Action Council Kannur (JACK) and a private individual named
B.K. Singhal.63
The Naz petitioners challenged the constitutionality of § 377
under Article 14 (equal protection), Article 15 (prohibition of, among
other things, sex discrimination), 19 (free speech and expression), and
Article 21 (protection of life and personal liberty).64 They also argued
that the Indian Penal Code’s condemnation of homosexuality was
outdated and not in keeping with Indian culture.65 But rather than ask
for the provision to be struck down entirely, the petitioners asked
that § 377 be read down to only criminalize penile-non-vaginal sex
when it is non-consensual or involves a minor.66
For the most part, the Delhi High Court hung its hat on three
constitutional arguments. First, the court held that the Indian
Constitution indirectly supports a fundamental right to privacy that is
linked to persons not places, as well as a right to a dignified life, and
NAZ INDIA, http://nazindia.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
Naz Foundation, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 7455 (2001), at 6.
62 Id. at 13, 17.
63 Id. at 10-13, 21. JACK campaigns against recognition of any causal connection
between HIV and AIDS, as well as against the use of anti-retroviral drugs. Anju
Singh, Making Waves, Changing Tides: The Story of Joint Action Council Kannur (JACK),
India, FREEREPUBLIC.COM (Nov. 13, 2001),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/569758/posts. The late B.P. Singhal
was a former Director General of Police and Rajya Sabha member for the rightwing Bharatiya Janata Party. Shivam Vij, BP Singhal: “I don’t have any problem with
homosexuals. Do you?” KAFILA (July 9, 2009), http://kafila.org/2009/07/09/bpsinghal-i-dont-have-any-problem-with-homosexuals-do-you/.
64 Naz Foundation, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 7455 (2001), at 2.
65 Id. at 27, 75-76.
66 Id. at 10 (submitting that “that there is a case for consensual sexual intercourse
(of the kind mentioned above; i.e. homosexual) between two willing adults in
privacy to be saved and excepted from the penal provision contained in Section
377 IPC”).
60
61
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that both rights require protection for private consensual sex acts
between adults (the Article 21 argument). Second, it held that even if
§ 377 reflects popular morality concerning sodomy, popular morality
alone does not constitute the kind of compelling state interest that’s
required to restrict a fundamental right (the Article 14 argument).
And third, the court held that “sex” includes “sexual orientation” for
the purposes of equal protection analysis (the Article 15 argument).
The decision also touched on several other issues—for instance, the
High Court’s privacy reasoning was tied to arguments about
autonomy and substantive due process, while its “compelling state
interest” analysis relied heavily on U.S. jurisprudence on strict
scrutiny.
Many commentators praised the High Court’s argument that
expressions of public morality via the law are still subject to an
overarching “constitutional morality.” 67 Others emphasized the
expansion of “sex” to include “sexual orientation,”68 while still others
called Naz’s subtle re-reading of privacy protection its “most
attractive feature.”69 It’s worth noting that there are a decent number
of problems with the legal analysis in Naz and that not all of the
arguments that could have been made were made (or at least, not all
of them were made well).70 But overall, both the outcome and the
reasoning have been widely celebrated.
Gautam Bhatia, The Unbearable Wrongness of Koushal vs Naz, OUTLOOK (Dec. 11,
2013), http://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/the-unbearable-wrongnessof-koushal-vs-naz/288823; Rohit Sharma, The Public and Constitutional Morality
Conundrum: A Case-Note on the Naz Foundation Judgement, 2 NAT’L U. JURID. STUD.
445 (2009). See also Martha C. Nussbaum, Disgust or Equality? Sexual Orientation and
Indian Law, 6 INDIAN J. L. & SOC’Y (forthcoming 2016), at 21 (“given that the claim
of public morality is the central such claim, showing that the interest in
criminalising consensual gay sex acts is actually motivated by disgust and stigma
helps to establish the constitutional unsuitability of the interest, in a nation
committee to equality”) (on file with author).
68 Bret Boyce, Sexuality and Gender Identity Under the Constitution of India, 18 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 39 (2015).
69 Vikram Raghavan, Navigating the Noteworthy and the Nebulous in Naz Foundation, 2
NAT’L U. JURID. STUD. 396, 403 (2009).
70 Martha Nussbaum, Sex Equality, Liberty, and Privacy: A Comparative Approach to the
Feminist Critique, in INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION: IDEAS, PRACTICES,
CONTROVERSIES 242 (Zoya Hassan et al. eds., 2004) (critiquing the use of privacy
arguments for the purposes of advancing gender justice), cited in Raghavan, supra
note 69, at 405; Pritam Baruah, Logic and Coherence in Naz Foundation: The Arguments
of Non-Discrimination, Privacy, and Dignity, 2 NAT’L U. JURID. STUD. 504 (2009)
(arguing that the cases cited by the Court do not support the idea that sex
discrimination encompasses sexual orientation discrimination, and that Naz
inadequately defined the concepts of privacy and autonomy).
67
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Conversely, Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation has
inspired little besides anger and ridicule. The named petitioner, an
astrologer, filed one of the many PIL suits challenging Naz on
broadly religious or cultural grounds that were eventually
consolidated for consideration by the Supreme Court.71 The actual
petitioners in Koushal included several “public spirited” individuals
(including B.P. Singhal of Naz fame), two small political parties, a
Keralite church alliance, JACK (also a Naz participant), the All India
Muslim Personal Law Board, and a government entity called the
Delhi Commission for the Protection of Child Rights.72
The Koushal petitioners argued, among other things, that the
High Court’s findings of fact as to the harms caused by § 377 were
insufficient—in other words, that there wasn’t enough proof that the
provision discouraged people from seeking HIV/AIDS support or
that it caused privacy or dignity harms.73 They also challenged Naz’s
holding that § 377 discriminates against homosexuals as a class and
that sex discrimination encompasses sexual orientation
discrimination.74 Several petitioners also made variants of a claim that
the High Court had violated the separation of powers by failing to
defer to the will of Parliament and, by extension, to the existence of a
public morality that condemns same-sex acts.75
There’s not much in the way of original reasoning in
Koushal, 76 but subsequent commentators have teased out the
following arguments from Justice Singhvi’s decidedly minimalist
analysis: (1) § 377’s prohibition of sodomy is presumptively
constitutional because the Indian Penal Code was duly enacted (in
1860) and remains unamended; (2) this presumption of
constitutionality stands because the High Court did not establish that
sufficiently severe harms are inflicted upon sufficiently numerous
people in the course of “valid” efforts to enforce the provision; (3)
people who engage in carnal intercourse against “against the order of
Koushal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 (2013), at 15-20.
Id.
73 Id. at 21-22.
74 Koushal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 (2013), at 21-23.
75 Id. at 26 (argument by the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) that
“so long as the law stands on the statute book, there was a constitutional
presumption in its favour”); id. at 25 (argument by the Kranthikari Manuvadi
Morcha Party that “the matter should have been left to Parliament to decide as to
what is moral and what is immoral and whether the section in question should be
retained in the statute book”).
76 Nussbaum, supra note 67, at 24 (observing that “[a]s for law, there is almost
nothing there”).
71
72
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nature” are a different class such that different laws can be applied
against them without constitutional difficulty.
Needless to say, there are problems with this—not because
there was no plausible argument to be made for reversing the Delhi
High Court, but because Koushal contained virtually no argument at
all. Most of the Supreme Court’s review of Naz is perplexing or just
plain wrong, so that all that is seemingly left coherent in Koushal is the
bare argument of judicial deference to legislative acts. Deference, of
course, is a perfectly legitimate ground for declining to invalidate a
law even in the relatively deference-thin context of the Indian federal
judiciary. But in the absence of any real attempt to grapple with the
issues (and the presence of page after page of block quotations
cribbed from other judges’ efforts at grappling), the Koushal Court’s
deference appears to be nothing so much as a small and rather
transparent fig leaf.
Having said all this, my intent is not to demonstrate why
Koushal is a bad decision since it has been pretty thoroughly picked
apart by many excellent commentators. Indeed, for our purposes,
Naz and Koushal are interesting not because they are exemplars of legal
reasoning or the lack thereof, but because they exemplify different
trends in public interest litigation. To see why, we need to step back
from the opinions and focus instead on the litigants and issues.
B. Competing Public Interests
Detached from § 377 and the criminalization of sodomy, Naz
and Koushal are easily recognizable as examples of “classic” and
“contemporary” PIL suits. Consider the moving parties: Naz was
brought by a coalition of progressive-minded civil society actors and
sympathetic government subsidiaries, while Koushal was brought by a
coalition of individual litigants and community organizations—
religious rather than residential, perhaps, but community
organizations nonetheless.77 Or take the underlying goals of the suits
See, e.g., Almitra H. Patel v. Union of India, 2 S.C.C. 416 (1998) (asking the Court
to require the Delhi government to address air and water pollution caused by
untreated solid wastes); Bangalore Medical Trust v. B. S Muddappa, A.I.R. 1991
S.C. 1902 (regarding the State of Karnataka’s decision to lease land intended for a
public park to a company for the purpose of building a nursing home). The latter
opinion really demonstrates the turn to middle-class interests and a vision of the
state as agent rather than sovereign: “…in a democratic set up the people or
community being sovereign, the exercise of discretion must be guided by the
inherent philosophy that the exerciser of discretion is accountable for his action…”
and “[p]ublic park as a place reserved for beauty and recreation is associated with
77
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according to the moving parties (rather than according to the courts).
The original writ petition submitted by the Naz Foundation in 2001
repeatedly references social attitudes and affirmative rights—“selfrespect and dignity” on the one hand, and “doctrinaire and
outmoded conception[s] of sexual relations” on the other. 78
Conversely, the key Koushal petitioners explained their motivations
primarily using the language of religious or cultural protection and
judicial deference. 79 And finally, remember for whom the moving
parties were acting: marginalized and scorned minorities in Naz,
versus themselves and similarly situated citizens in Koushal.
Seen in this light, Naz is clearly the archetype of the classic
PIL suit in which philanthropic third-parties fight to change Indian
society by defending or expanding the rights of disadvantaged
groups. And just as surely—though perhaps not as clearly—Koushal is
emblematic of a more contemporary PIL suit in which parties who
are actually motivated by a sense of personal harm fight to hold the
state up to its obligations as the agent of a sovereign, rights-bearing
democratic citizenry.
Interestingly, and despite their focus on religious and cultural
protection, there’s no reason to think the Koushal petitioners drew on
growth of the concept of equality and recognition of importance of common
man.” Bangalore Medical Trust, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1902, at 109.
78 Naz Foundation, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 7455 (2001), at 6 (“unless the selfrespect and dignity of sexuality minorities is restored by doing away with
discriminatory laws such as Section 377, it will not be possible to promote
HIV/AIDS prevention”), and at 12 (“Section 377 is indeed based upon a
doctrinaire and outmoded conception of sexual relations, which has later been used
to legitimize discrimination against sexuality minorities”) available at
http://www.lawyerscollective.org/vulnerable-communities/lgbt/section-377.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
79 See, e.g., the argument of the Trust God Missionaries, Koushal, Civil Appeal No.
10972 (2013), at 25 (“if the declaration made by the High Court is approved, then
India’s social structure and the institution of marriage will be detrimentally affected
and young persons will be tempted towards homosexual activities”); the argument
of the AIMPLB, id. at 26 (“[c]ourts, by their very nature, should not undertake the
task of legislating”); Some of the Koushal petitioners also appealed to child
protection and the non-absolute nature of all rights: see the argument of Suresh
Kumar Koushal, id. at 27 (“all fundamental rights operate in a square of reasonable
restrictions”); Pallavi Polanki, Why Delhi Child Rights Commission Opposed Decriminalization of Gay Sex, FIRSTPOST.COM (Dec. 14, 2013),
http://www.firstpost.com/india/why-delhi-child-rights-commission-opposed-decriminalisation-of-gay-sex-1286883.html (observing that “[i]n the last 150 years,
there have been only 200 cases were this section has been effectively applied,” that
“[a]ll those cases applied to sodomy and in more than 90 per cent of the cases, the
victims were minors,” before concluding that “the application of the Section 377
was to protect victims”).
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§ 295(A) of the Indian Penal Code.80 To be sure, § 295(A) punishes
“deliberate and malicious” action that offends religious beliefs—it
would translate to something like a criminal charge of intentional
infliction of emotional distress (for religion) in the American
context—and it seems ludicrous to think of Naz Foundation
members being imprisoned or otherwise subject to criminal liability
for their advocacy and social work.81 But there remains a troubling
potential for overlap between § 295(A) and § 377 as against LGBT
individuals, so that (especially given the wide and frequently specious
net cast by the Koushal petitioners and Court) an argument combining
the two IPC sections wouldn’t have seemed wholly out of place.
It’s true that Koushal stands somewhat apart from the new
model of PIL suits inasmuch as it focuses on religion, culture, and
morality claims rather than on economic or good governance
demands. But this difference does not fundamentally change the fact
that Koushal, like many of the contemporary PIL suits decried by
court-watchers and legal scholars, emphasizes the state’s duty to be a
good agent (meaning a good agent of the petitioners) rather than a
good reformer. While it’s always risky to indulge in post-facto
speculation regarding litigation strategies, the most plausible
explanation for the fact that Koushal omitted any § 295(A)
arguments might simply be that petitioners and judges alike
recognized the approach’s political weakness, or that the credibility of
PIL suits depends on the petitioners’ ability to demonstrate that they
“have no personal, political or financial interest of any kind in the
public interest litigation brought.”82
It also doesn’t matter that the outcome sought by the Koushal
petitioners may be fundamentally distasteful in a way that preferring
parks over nursing homes is not. The fact that Koushal stands apart
from many other “contemporary” PIL suits (to say nothing of
“classic” ones) in its espousal of a social conservative rather than a
neo-liberal morality just goes to show that public interest litigation is
incapable of returning consistently progressive or even consistently
non-progressive results. Indeed, this point is being made with growing
frequency by the commentators discussed in Part I. But what isn’t
Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860), § 295–298 (prohibiting harms to
religious sentiments under various circumstances). The Koushal opinion itself makes
no reference to § 295, and this element of the statute does not seem to figure in
public conversations (including those emphasizing the petitioners’ point of view).
81 Naz Foundation, after all, would not even be in a position analogous to the
doctors in Griswold who were subject to criminal liability for prescribing
contraceptives. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
82 Susman, supra note 16, at 70 (emphasis mine).
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being said is that—notwithstanding specific outcomes like Naz and
Koushal—the fact that public interest litigation gets deployed to
inconsistent ends is a reflection of something fundamental and
fundamentally good in the Indian Constitution.
III. DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
If Naz and Koushal represent the great divide that supporters
of public interest litigation are anxious to address, why does this leave
us with anything save a whole lot of bad? After all, Indian law and
politics are strikingly concerned with social uplift.83 Why isn’t it cause
for disappointment when a once-celebrated path to progressive ends
turns out to lead elsewhere as well? The answer is simply that Indian
law and politics—we can even go so far as to say Indian
constitutionalism and democracy—were never meant to exclusively
pursue aspirational goals. That they are meant to pursue such goals is
beyond question. Nevertheless, as I’ve argued elsewhere, this support
for government-driven societal reform coexists with contrasting (and
constitutionally defined) political values. 84 Indian jurisprudence,
including public interest litigation, properly reflects the constant
recalibration between these different visions of state-society relations.
Briefly put, the two underlying impulses in this
constitutionally enshrined dynamic equilibrium correspond to two
understandings of democratic sovereignty. On the one hand, the
Indian Constitution is “first and foremost a social document” and a
“majority of its provisions are either directly aimed at furthering the
goals of the social revolution or attempt to foster this revolution by
establishing the conditions necessary for its achievement.”85 In this
“militant” vision of democratic ordering, the state exercises far more
See, e.g., the comment of a prominent Supreme Court advocate that the
“Constitution of India is very much focused on social change. And so we as
citizens, as lawyers, whenever we look at a program or whenever we criticize a
program, we have this one test in front of us: how is it going to advance social
justice?” Indira Jaising, Case in Point: Challenges to Rule of Law and Gender
Equality Globally (Feb. 16, 2016, at 19:32-48),
http://caseinpoint.org/live/news/5879-challenges-to-rule-of-law-and-genderequality#.VtH6h0tSxuZ.
84 Das Acevedo, Temples, Courts, supra note 10; Deepa Das Acevedo, Celibate Gods
and “Essential Practices” Jurisprudence at Sabarimala, 1991-2011, in FILING RELIGION:
STATE, HINDUISM, AND COURTS OF LAW 101 (Daniella Berti et al, eds.,, 2016);
Deepa Das Acevedo, Religion, Law, and the Making of a Liberal Indian State ch. 1
(2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago) (on file with author).
85 GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A
NATION 50 (1999).
83
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than the discretionary authority we might ordinarily expect of an
agent or representative—for example, it can regulate anything
touching the “secular aspects of religion.” (It can also regulate a great
deal touching the religious aspects of religion, but that’s beyond the
scope of this paper.)
Indeed, many of the Constitution’s provisions and the
practices they give rise to reflect an explicitly articulated worry that
Indian citizens are not yet capable of fully exercising their authority
as democratic sovereigns. Take, for example, the concerns of some
drafters—eventually reflected in constitutional prose—that unlimited
individual freedoms would hamper the state’s ability to reform
society. 86 Or consider Justice Bhagwati’s worry that the average
Indian’s religious beliefs would, if unchecked and unchanged,
encourage a whole host of violent and discriminatory practices.87 (It’s
worth noting that Bhagwati was one of the Supreme Court justices
who created public interest litigation.) Basic structure doctrine too
reflects a mistrust of untrammelled popular democracy, inasmuch as
it places the undefined “essential features” of the Constitution
beyond parliamentary revision (although admittedly India’s founding
document is far more open to amendment than its un-entrenched
American counterpart).88

Id. at 64 (describing Amrit Kaur and A.K. Ayyar’s views that the freedom of
religion and equality before the law should be worded so that they did not interfere
with the state’s mission to transform social relations). See also Sathe, who writes
that “Many Indian leaders who had made sacrifices for national independence were
of the view that the legislature should be supreme… However this view was not
unanimously accepted. Persons representing the minorities were apprehensive of
the majoritarian rule implicit in such an arrangement. They wanted greater say for
the courts.” SATHE, supra note 7, at 3
87 P.N. Bhagwati, Religion and Secularism Under the Indian Constitution, in RELIGION
AND LAW IN INDEPENDENT INDIA 35, 43 (Robert D. Baird, ed., 2005) (stating that
India’s constitutional framers “knew that, left to itself, religion could permit
orthodox men to burn widows alive on the piers [sic] of their deceased husbands…
could encourage and in its own subtle ways, even coerce indulgence in social evils
like child marriage or even crimes like human sacrifice or it could consign women
to the perpetual fate of devadasis or relegate large sections of humanity to the subhuman status of untouchability and inferiority”).
88 The basic structure doctrine was first announced in Kesavananda Bharati v. State
of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461. For a useful overview of Kesavananda and the basic
structure doctrine, see David Gwynn Morgan, The Indian ‘Essential Features’ Case, 30
THE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 2 (1981), and Pratap
Bhanu Mehta, The Inner Conflict of Constitutionalism: Judicial Review and the ‘Basic
Structure’, in INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION: IDEAS, PRACTICES, CONTROVERSIES
179 ( Zoya Hasan et al eds., 2005). For a more detailed study see SUDHIR
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In light of all this, any suggestion that Indian democracy is
straightforwardly founded on the idea of citizen sovereignty has more
holes than Swiss cheese. It is not merely that India, like all countries,
operates under a de facto arrangement whereby “elites, not masses,
govern.” 89 It is that the Indian state is meant to have a share in
sovereign authority so that it can do more than just realize specific
goods set out in advance by the people being governed. And it is in
exactly this spirit that classic PIL petitioners and courts set out to
improve the lives of India’s most marginalized citizens.
On the other hand, it would also be incorrect to say that a
more conventional understanding of democratic sovereignty as
citizen-sovereignty finds no place in Indian constitutional law or
practice. The Indian Constitution guards against incursions into the
private lives of individuals by allowing for classically liberal
protections like “freedom of conscience and free profession, practice
and propagation of religion.” 90 B.N. Rau famously campaigned
against including a (substantive) due process clause in the
Constitution after his conversations with James Bradley Thayer and
Felix Frankfurter led him to believe it would be an undemocratic
check on the legislative process (although this “check” was eventually
introduced by none other than Justice Bhagwati in Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India). 91 Above all else, though, the drafters of the
Constitution were “intellectually committed to the liberal democratic
tradition” and the idea that individual adult suffrage as the basis of
political life was the “sine qua non of independence.”92
It is probably harder to recognize this vision of undivided
citizen sovereignty in contemporary public interest litigation than it is
to see shared sovereignty in classic PIL cases—and it’s also risky to
even indirectly imply that citizen sovereignty naturally fits with social
conservatism or neo-liberal politics. I am only making the first of
KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: A STUDY OF
THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE (2009).
89 THOMAS R. DYE & HARMON ZIEGLER, 14 THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY: AN
UNCOMMON INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (14th ed. 2008).
90 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Part III: Fundamental Rights, art. 25.
91 A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597. Abhinav Chandrachud, Of Constitutional “Due Process,”
THEHINDU.COM (May 24, 2010), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/ofconstitutional-due-process/article436586.ece. For a discussion of Thayer and
Frankfurter’s influence on Rau, see Arvind Elangovan, A Constitutional
Imagination of India: Sir Benegal Narsing Rau Amidst the Retreat of Liberal
Idealism, 1910-1950, at 21 (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago); AUSTIN,
supra note 85, at 103.
92 Id. at 41, 46
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these arguments, namely, that contemporary public interest cases
align with liberal democratic ideas of statehood and personhood as
these are broadly and conventionally understood. For example, PIL
petitioners who argue for the municipal maintenance of “common
spaces” rely on a view of the individual-in-society, with all its
accompanying baggage about public/private divides, that is decidedly
and classically liberal.93 PIL petitioners who argue for transparency
and accountability in governance rely on a view of sovereign
delegation and agency theory that is decidedly and classically
democratic.94 And, whatever their particular merits or appeal, PIL
petitioners who argue for the preservation of religious and cultural
mores—at least, for their preservation until the legislature says
otherwise—are relying on liberal democratic conceptions of society
and sovereignty that also have a place in India’s founding document.
CONCLUSION
Saying that Naz and Koushal and public interest litigation all
reflect a dynamic equilibrium between different visions of sovereignty
does not by itself establish that having such a dynamic equilibrium is
good. Nor, for that matter, does it give us much of an idea as to how
we should proceed—with Koushal, with public interest litigation, or
with understanding Indian constitutional law more generally. So far I
have been concerned with making an interpretive argument about
processes at various levels of law in India, but let me close with a few
thoughts on what this argument does and does not mean for the way
forward.
First, it most certainly does not mean that progressives
should like Koushal or that we should stop fighting for broadly leftcenter causes. It also does not mean that anyone should denigrate or
de-emphasize the very real, very aspirational elements of the Indian
Constitution and of democracy in India. But it does mean that
progressives shouldn’t respond to the so-called “conservative turn”
in public interest litigation by throwing up our hands or by
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1985 S.C.C. (3) 545.
See, e.g., Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1988) 1 S.C.C. 226 (concerning the
Central Bureau of Investigation’s failure to investigation evidence suggesting that
high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats were trading government contracts for
bribes); Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996) 6 S.C.C. 530 (concerning
allegations that the Minister of State for Petroleum and Gas had improperly allotted
petrol pump and gas agencies to government officials or their relatives).
93
94
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scrambling for newer, better fixes. Public interest litigation can’t be
“fixed,” if fixing it means ensuring that it only produces progressive
outcomes, any more than we can “fix” the Indian Constitution. And
honestly, it shouldn’t be fixed in this way. The great good sense of
Indian constitutional law has been its flexibility; its incorporation of
all kinds of legal traditions in the nation’s charter, its catholicism in
selecting mechanisms and sources and analytic rubrics when
interpreting that charter, and its willingness to rewrite the charter
with the benefit of lessons learned. The dynamic equilibrium between
different visions of sovereign authority that I have described
elsewhere and the particular manifestation of that dynamic in public
interest litigation that I have described here is just one more example
of the flexibility that has served India more than tolerably well for
nearly seventy years.
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